Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments (Q283189): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
RedirectionBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
Import241208061232 (talk | contribs)
Normalize DOI.
 
(6 intermediate revisions by 6 users not shown)
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0184-7 / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2227658232 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Contests with rank-order spillovers / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Relative Performance Compensation, Contests, and Dynamic Incentives / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Contingent payments in selection contests / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: March Madness and the Office Pool / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1007/S10058-015-0184-7 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 13:23, 9 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments
scientific article

    Statements

    Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    13 May 2016
    0 references
    tournaments
    0 references
    relative performance
    0 references
    experiment
    0 references
    principal-agent
    0 references

    Identifiers