The institution as a blunt instrument: cooperation through imperfect observability (Q306788): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.02.013 / rank
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Latest revision as of 14:59, 9 December 2024

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The institution as a blunt instrument: cooperation through imperfect observability
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    The institution as a blunt instrument: cooperation through imperfect observability (English)
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    1 September 2016
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    evolution of cooperation
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    prisoners dilemma
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    evolutionary stability
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    non-uniform interaction rates
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    institutions
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    institutional screening
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    imperfect observability
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