The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures (Q384518): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1007/s11750-011-0191-y / rank
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Latest revision as of 15:59, 9 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
scientific article

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    The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures (English)
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    28 November 2013
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    coalition structure
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    two-step Shapley value
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    weighted Shapley value
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    coalition-size weights
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    axiomatization
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    implementation
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    collective value
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