Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules (Q417718): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.geb.2011.11.008
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+College admissions with affirmative action
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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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+Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
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+The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Constrained school choice
@@ Property / cites work: Constrained school choice / rank @@
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+Nash implementation of matching rules
@@ Property / cites work: Nash implementation of matching rules / rank @@
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+Implementation of college admission rules
@@ Property / cites work: Implementation of college admission rules / rank @@
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
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+Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
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+Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
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+Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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+Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.008
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.008 / rank @@
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