Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules (Q417718): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.geb.2011.11.008
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.008 / rank @@
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@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B68
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6034675
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6034675 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+deferred acceptance algorithm
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: deferred acceptance algorithm / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+dominant strategy implementation
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: dominant strategy implementation / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+stability
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: stability / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+weak nonbossiness
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: weak nonbossiness / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+multiple equilibria
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: multiple equilibria / rank @@
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@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.008
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W1978974927
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W1978974927 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+College admissions with affirmative action
@@ Property / cites work: College admissions with affirmative action / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Constrained school choice
@@ Property / cites work: Constrained school choice / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Nash implementation of matching rules
@@ Property / cites work: Nash implementation of matching rules / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation of college admission rules
@@ Property / cites work: Implementation of college admission rules / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.008
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.008 / rank @@
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:417718