A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura) (Q422368): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0291-9 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0291-9 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2030361769 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 17:04, 9 December 2024

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A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)
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