Run theorems for low returns and large banks (Q471314): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 18:27, 9 December 2024

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Run theorems for low returns and large banks
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    Run theorems for low returns and large banks (English)
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    14 November 2014
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    The main object of the paper is ``to identify model economies exposed to the threat of bank runs in the framework by \textit{D. W. Diamond} and \textit{P. H. Dybvig} with sequential service'' [J. Polit. Econ. 91, No. 3, 401--419 (1983; Zbl 1341.91135)]. The authors' model is rather simple. There are \(N\) identical depositors that live for two dates and derive utility from date consumptions \((c_1, c_2)\) received as a bank transfers. In the first date, the economy is hit by a shock \(\omega\in \{0, \, 1\}^N \) with probability \(P(\omega)=p^{N-|\omega|}(1-p)^{|\omega|}\) where \(|\omega|=\omega_1 + \cdots +\omega_N \). Each individual \(i\) has preferences defined by \(\omega_i\). There are initial endowments which are controlled by the bank, and their parts, not spent during date 1, grow at some growth rate. Within the frame of the model the authors ``provide a precise condition under which banks are susceptible to a run when the return on investment is low'', and they show ``that sufficiently large banks are always susceptible to a run. One interpretation of the condition is that exposure to runs occurs when desire for consumption smoothing or predictability of preference profiles are relatively high.''
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    bank runs
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    run equilibria
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    low-return runs
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    large-bank runs
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