Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion (Q490945): Difference between revisions

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-.1007/s10058-014-0163-4
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s10058-014-0163-4 / rank @@
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Q3995616
@@ Property / cites work: Q3995616 / rank @@
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+Q4130997
@@ Property / cites work: Q4130997 / rank @@
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+A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
+Normal rank
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+Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
+Normal rank
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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+Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S10058-014-0163-4
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S10058-014-0163-4 / rank @@
+Normal rank