Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information (Q497941): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 19:31, 9 December 2024

scientific article
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English
Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
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    Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information (English)
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    25 September 2015
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    third-party contracts
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    commitment
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    strategic delegation
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    renegotiation
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    asymmetric information
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    renegotiation-proofness
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    entry-deterrence
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