Extending possibilistic logic over Gödel logic (Q622285): Difference between revisions

The paper introduces some modal-like propositional logics to deal with necessity measures over Gödel algebras of fuzzy events, and studies their completeness with respect to Kripke-style semantics and some relevant computational aspects. In particular, the logics introduced in the paper have a restricted language that does not allow nesting of modalities: they can be thought as two-layer logics, where non-modal formulas deal with (fuzzy) events, while modal formulas refer to the (fuzzy) necessity of those events. The authors study three such logical systems, plus common fragments of those. Each one of these three main logics is axiomatised so as to be complete with respect to a Kripke-like semantics where the modality is interpreted as a necessity measure, which in turns is related to a normalised possibility distribution by means of one of three fuzzy implications. Namely, the logics studied are: (1) Kleene-Dienes implication-based necessity logic; (2) Reciprocal of Gödel implication-based necessity logic; (3) Gödel implication-based necessity logic. The authors denote by \(G_\Delta(C)\) Gödel propositional logic expanded with \(\Delta\)-projection and a set \(C\) of constants interpreted in \([0,1]\). The Kripke-like semantics is defined as follows. Given a set \(C\) of constant symbols, a \(C\)-basic necessity Kripke model is a triple \((W,e,I)\) where \(W\) is the set of worlds, \(e(w,.)\) is an evaluation of variables to \([0,1]\) extended to non-modal formulas by means of the standard semantics of \(G_\Delta(C)\), and, after the introduction of the notation \(\hat{\varphi}\) for the function mapping each \(w \in W\) to \(e(w,\varphi)\), the map \(I : \{\hat{\varphi} \mid \varphi {\text{ non-modal}} \} \to [0,1]\) is a basic necessity, that is, a function mapping \(\hat{c}\) for each constant \(c \in C\) to its corresponding value in \([0,1]\) and such that \(I(\widehat{a \wedge b}) = \min(I(\hat{a}),I(\hat{b}))\). The interpretation of atomic modal formulas \(N\varphi\) is \(I(\hat{\varphi})\), while the truth-value of a modal but not atomic formula is computed compounding the values of its atomic modal components using the standard semantics of \(G_\Delta(C)\). The authors first prove completeness for a logic of basic necessity \(\text{NG}^0(C)\) with respect to the class of basic necessity models defined above; then they axiomatise (1)--(3) as extensions (an expansion of the language is also needed to deal with (3)) of \(\text{NG}^0(C)\) and prove completeness with respect to suitably defined classes of basic necessity models. They show that, for each integer \(n \geq 0\), the satisfiability problem of formulas in \(n\) variables in \(\text{NG}^0(C)\) and in each logic (1)--(3) is decidable in polynomial time.