Information acquisition and full surplus extraction (Q617680): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.jet.2010.08.003
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.003 / rank @@
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+Publication
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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.003
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+W3123576996
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W3123576996 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Ex post implementation
@@ Property / cites work: Ex post implementation / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Information structures in optimal auctions
@@ Property / cites work: Information structures in optimal auctions / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types
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+Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
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+Auctions with costly information acquisition
@@ Property / cites work: Auctions with costly information acquisition / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Information acquisition in committees
@@ Property / cites work: Information acquisition in committees / rank @@
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+Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The value of information for auctioneers
@@ Property / cites work: The value of information for auctioneers / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
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+Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Would rational voters acquire costly information?
@@ Property / cites work: Would rational voters acquire costly information? / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3775284
@@ Property / cites work: Q3775284 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
@@ Property / cites work: Correlated Information and Mecanism Design / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The relevance of private information in mechanism design
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Information Acquisition in Auctions
@@ Property / cites work: Information Acquisition in Auctions / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Committee Design with Endogenous Information
@@ Property / cites work: Committee Design with Endogenous Information / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Continuity in auction design
@@ Property / cites work: Continuity in auction design / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
@@ Property / cites work: Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting / rank @@
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.JET.2010.08.003
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2010.08.003 / rank @@
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:617680