Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion (Q633772): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00712-010-0165-9 / rank
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Property / cites work: The Make-or-Buy Decision in the Presence of a Rival: Strategic Outsourcing to a Common Supplier / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Commitment and observability in games / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Explaining cross-supplies / rank
 
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Property / cites work: The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 23:09, 9 December 2024

scientific article
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Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion
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    Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion (English)
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    30 March 2011
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    sourcing
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    entry deterrence
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    Stackelberg competition
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    Cournot competition
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