Unique stability in simple coalition formation games (Q705860): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.004 / rank
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Latest revision as of 01:17, 10 December 2024

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Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
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    Unique stability in simple coalition formation games (English)
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    16 February 2005
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    matching
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    core
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    strategy proofness
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