Optimal contracts with contingent allocation (Q777726): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.econlet.2020.109202
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109202 / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109202
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W3023320822
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W3023320822 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
@@ Property / cites work: Correlated Information and Mecanism Design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal contracts with public ex post information
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal contracts with public ex post information / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Continuity in auction design
@@ Property / cites work: Continuity in auction design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109202
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109202 / rank @@
+Normal rank