Noisy leadership: An experimental approach (Q863265): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.geb.2006.05.004
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.004 / rank @@
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+Güth, Werner
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+Yossef Spiegel
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+W3121856501
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Commitment and observability in games
@@ Property / cites work: Commitment and observability in games / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ``weak link'' coordination games
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Unobserved Delegation
@@ Property / cites work: Unobserved Delegation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Equity, efficiency and evolutionary stability in bargaining games with joint production
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4610958
@@ Property / cites work: Q4610958 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Games with imperfectly observable commitment
@@ Property / cites work: Games with imperfectly observable commitment / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.GEB.2006.05.004
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2006.05.004 / rank @@
+Normal rank