Manipulation via capacities revisited (Q980957): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.geb.2009.12.006
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+Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
@@ Property / cites work: Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
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+Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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+.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.006
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.006 / rank @@
+Normal rank