Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability (Q1021616): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.geb.2008.04.019
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.019 / rank @@
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+Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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+Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
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+Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
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+Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
@@ Property / cites work: Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations / rank @@
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+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation of college admission rules
@@ Property / cites work: Implementation of college admission rules / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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+Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
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+.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.019
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.019 / rank @@
+Normal rank