Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge (Q1024137): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Created a new Item |
Normalize DOI. |
||
(4 intermediate revisions by 4 users not shown) | |||
Property / DOI | |||
Property / DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9245-y / rank | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2089985709 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Inexact knowledge with introspection / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Knowing One’s Limits: An Analysis in Centered Dynamic Epistemic Logic / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Epistemology Without Knowledge and Without Belief / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Intensional logics without iterative axioms / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Verificaton, falsification, and cancellation in KT / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / DOI | |||
Property / DOI: 10.1007/S11229-007-9245-Y / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
links / mardi / name | links / mardi / name | ||
Latest revision as of 13:28, 10 December 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge |
scientific article |
Statements
Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge (English)
0 references
16 June 2009
0 references
The authors first describe an argument, originally formulated by T. Williamson, against the so-called epistemic transparency principle KK of epistemic logic. The argument is a reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, it is shown that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of KK and additional epistemic principles which are, according to Williamson, better grounded. Next, the authors distinguish two sorts of knowledge (viz., perceptual and reflective knowledge), provide criteria for the distinction, and on the basis of this distinction they consider different readings of the principles involved in Williamson's argument. They show that only certain readings are plausible; but under the plausible readings, Williamson's argument no longer yields a contradiction. Another reductio argument against KK formulated by Williamson, similar in structure to the former argument, is also analyzed and solved by the authors by appealing again to a distinction of types of knowledge. The authors' general conclusion is that Williamson's reductio arguments rest on an inappropriate identification of forms of knowledge, which according to the authors are constrained in different ways. Finally, they discuss non-perceptual knowledge in relation to margin for error principles in order to provide additional support to their analysis as well as offer replies to possible objections to the their proposal.
0 references
epistemic logic
0 references
epistemic paradoxes
0 references
margin for error principles
0 references
epistemic logical principle KK
0 references
perceptual knowledge
0 references
non-perceptual knowledge
0 references