On the existence of stable roommate matchings (Q1592723): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0779 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0779 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2054670965 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 22:15, 10 December 2024

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On the existence of stable roommate matchings
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