The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities (Q1616494): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 22:51, 10 December 2024

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The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
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    The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities (English)
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    6 November 2018
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    takeover
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    auction
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    externality
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    incomplete information
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    commitment
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