Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets (Q1668196): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.017
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.017 / rank @@
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+MaRDI publication profile
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.017
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+W2290756805
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2290756805 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
@@ Property / cites work: Endogenous budget constraints in auctions / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
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+The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
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+On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
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+On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
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+Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Auction Design
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal Auction Design / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.02.017
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.02.017 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:1668196