Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods (Q1707112): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1075-3 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1075-3 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 05:10, 11 December 2024

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Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
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    Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods (English)
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    28 March 2018
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    resource allocation
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    strategy-proofness
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    scoring allocation
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    indivisible goods
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