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Latest revision as of 14:29, 16 December 2024

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Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
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    Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach (English)
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    25 March 2013
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    rent seeking
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    contest success functions
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    asymmetric information
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    Bayesian mechanism design
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