Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples (Q1995461): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W3108053261 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 16:58, 16 December 2024

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Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
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    Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples (English)
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    23 February 2021
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    competing mechanisms
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    folk theorems
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    exclusive competition
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