Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma (Q2008513): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2018.11.029 / rank
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2900861343 / rank
 
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Property / arXiv ID: 1812.03479 / rank
 
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Property / Wikidata QID: Q128818747 / rank
 
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Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.AMC.2018.11.029 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 18:15, 16 December 2024

scientific article
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Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
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    Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma (English)
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    26 November 2019
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    cooperation
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    punishment
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    monitoring
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    reporting
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    common resource
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