Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences (Q2025006): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105197 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105197 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 19:38, 16 December 2024

scientific article
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Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
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    Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences (English)
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    11 May 2021
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    individual rationality
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    Pareto-efficiency
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    strategy-proofness
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    indivisible goods
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    multi-unit demand
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