Strategic bidding in price coupled regions (Q2155379): Difference between revisions

In this paper, the authors propose a bilevel formulation for the bidding problem (BP) and reformulate it as an mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC): \[ \begin{array}{l} (BP-MPEC)\max \sum_{n\in N, t\in T}\left (\sum_{t\in T}\lambda_n^tp_n^t\right )-c(p_n) \\ s.t. \: \: \: \: \: \: \: \: p_n\in P_n;\: n\in N \\ \sum_{b\in B_n}Q_b^tx_b^t - \sum_{s\in S_n}Q_s^tx_s^t+ \sum_{m\in \theta_n}\left (f_{nm}^t-f_{mn}^t\right )=p_n^t;\: t\in T,\: n\in N \\ \left (\lambda _n^t-\pi _b^t\right )\left (1-x_b^t\right )\ge 0; \: \: t\in T,\: n\in N, \: b\in B_n \\ \left (-\lambda _n^t+\pi _s^t\right )\left (1-x_s^t\right )\ge 0; \: \: t\in T,\: n\in N, \: s\in S_n \\ \left (-\lambda _n^t+\pi _b^t\right )x_b^t \ge 0; \: \: t\in T,\: n\in N, \: b\in B_n \\ \left (\lambda _n^t-\pi _s^t\right )x_s^t \ge 0; \: \: t\in T,\: n\in N, \: s\in S_n \\ \lambda _n^t-\lambda_m^t+r_{nm}^t-r_{mn}^t=0; \: \: t\in T,\: nm\in A \\ C_{nm}^{\max }r_{nm}^t=f_{nm}^t\left (\lambda_m^t-\lambda_n^t\right ); \: \: t\in T,\: nm\in A \\ 0\le x_b^t\le 1; \: \: t\in T,\: n\in N,\: b\in B_n \\ 0\le x_s^t\le 1; \: \: t\in T,\: n\in N,\: s\in S_n \\ 0\le f_{nm}^t\le C_{nm}^{\max}; \: \: t\in T,\: nm \in A \\ r_{nm}^t\ge 0; \: \: t\in T,\: nm\in A \\ \end{array} \] General properties of this problem are studied to derive new valid inequalities and heuristic methods.