A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies (Q2254237): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1007/s10058-014-0160-7 / rank
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Property / author: Ịpek Gürsel Tapkı / rank
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2067896714 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 16:57, 17 December 2024

scientific article
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A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
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    A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies (English)
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    4 February 2015
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    regional development agencies
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    uniform mechanism
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    efficiency
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    strategy proofness
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    fairness
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    single peakedness
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