Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case (Q2276546): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.011 / rank
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Latest revision as of 19:13, 17 December 2024

scientific article
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Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
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    Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case (English)
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    6 November 2012
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    simultaneous ascending auctions
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    myopic bidding
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    signaling
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    ex-post efficiency
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