Modeling inequity aversion in a dictator game with production (Q2345028): Difference between revisions

Summary: We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of \textit{E. Fehr} and \textit{K. M. Schmidt} [Q. J. Econ. 114, No. 3, 817--868 (1999; Zbl 0944.91022)], and \textit{N. Frohlich} et al. [``Modeling other-regarding preferences and an experimental test'', Public Choice 119, No. 1--2, 91--117 (2004; \url{doi:10.1023/B:PUCH.0000024169.08329.eb})], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle). In our model, dictators may also account for the way in which the surplus was generated. More precisely, our model incorporates the idea of liberal egalitarian ethics into the analysis, making it possible for dictators to divide the surplus according to the accountability principle, which states that subjects should only be rewarded for factors under their control. This fairness ideal does not hold subjects responsible for factors beyond their control in the production of the surplus, an idea that is absent in the models of inequity aversion cited above.