Implementation via approval mechanisms (Q2359385): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.jet.2017.05.003
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.003 / rank @@
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+Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
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+One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
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+Q3323629
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+Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
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+Handbook on approval voting
@@ Property / cites work: Handbook on approval voting / rank @@
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
@@ Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank @@
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+The strategic sincerity of approval voting
@@ Property / cites work: The strategic sincerity of approval voting / rank @@
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+Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
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+Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.JET.2017.05.003
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2017.05.003 / rank @@
+Normal rank