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Latest revision as of 18:04, 18 December 2024

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Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
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    Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms (English)
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    13 June 2014
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    VCG payment scheme
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    communication complexity
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    combinatorial auctions
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    submodular bidders
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