Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules (Q4638087): Difference between revisions

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+Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
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-.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2017.35
@@ Property / DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2017.35 / rank @@
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+.09733
@@ Property / arXiv ID: 1605.09733 / rank @@
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+How hard is it to control an election?
@@ Property / cites work: How hard is it to control an election? / rank @@
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+Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
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+Condorcet Social Choice Functions
@@ Property / cites work: Condorcet Social Choice Functions / rank @@
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
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+Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?
@@ Property / cites work: Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament? / rank @@
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+Tournament solutions and majority voting
@@ Property / cites work: Tournament solutions and majority voting / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Choosing from a tournament
@@ Property / cites work: Choosing from a tournament / rank @@
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+Handbook of Computational Social Choice
@@ Property / cites work: Handbook of Computational Social Choice / rank @@
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+Can strategizing in round-robin subtournaments be avoided?
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+Ranking the Participants in a Tournament
@@ Property / cites work: Ranking the Participants in a Tournament / rank @@
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
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+Social Choice Scoring Functions
@@ Property / cites work: Social Choice Scoring Functions / rank @@
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+W2962709587
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2962709587 / rank @@
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@@ Property / title @@
+Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules (English)
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+.4230/LIPICS.ITCS.2017.35
@@ Property / DOI: 10.4230/LIPICS.ITCS.2017.35 / rank @@
+Normal rank