Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules (Q4638087): Difference between revisions

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Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
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Property / DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2017.35 / rank
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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / arXiv ID: 1605.09733 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2962709587 / rank
 
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Property / title
 
Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules (English)
Property / title: Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules (English) / rank
 
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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.4230/LIPICS.ITCS.2017.35 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 14:56, 30 December 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6866325
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English
Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6866325

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