The dynamical attainability of ESS in evolutionary games (Q811452): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 10:20, 30 July 2024
scientific article
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English | The dynamical attainability of ESS in evolutionary games |
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The dynamical attainability of ESS in evolutionary games (English)
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1991
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The attainability of ESS of the evolutionary game among n players under frequency independent selection is studied for a special concept of stability (SDS). It is assumed that natural selection and small mutations cause the phenotype to change gradually in the direction of increasing fitness. Strongly determined stability (SDS) is defined as follows. Let \(F_ i(x_ 1,...,x_ n)\) denote the fitness of the i-th species in an n-species game, where the strategies of the various species are \(x_ 1,...,x_ n\). The above assumptions imply dynamics of the following form: \[ (1)\quad dx_ i/dt=k_ i(x_ 1,...,x_ n)\cdot \partial F_ i/\partial x_ i \] where \(k_ i(.)>0\) is a coefficient measuring the adjustment speed. An equilibrium point of (1) satisfies SDS if it is locally stable for any functional form of the \(k_ i\), and remains so under small perturbations of the \(F_ i.\) Mathematically, this amounts to saying that all eigenvalues of the linearized system have negative real parts; this can be expressed in terms of certain conditions (Routh-Hurwicz) on the second derivatives of the \(F_ i\), independently of the \(k_ i\). The authors argue that an ESS can be considered as a goal of evolution only if it is SDS. It is shown that in the two-species competitive case, the Nash solution is always attainable, and that in general one of two species may attain minimum fitness as a result of evolution. The attainability of ESS is also examined in two examples on the sex ratio of wasps and aphids.
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Routh-Hurwicz condition
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evolutionary stable strategies
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frequency independent selection
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mutations
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Strongly determined stability
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SDS
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n- species game
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equilibrium
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eigenvalues
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two-species competitive case
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Nash solution
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attainability of ESS
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sex ratio
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