On the operation of multiple matching markets (Q516981): Difference between revisions

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+W2529965891
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+Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
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+House allocation with existing tenants
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+Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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+Voting by Committees
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+Voting by committees under constraints
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+Markovian assignment rules
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+A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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+Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
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+School choice with neighbors
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+Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
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+Two-sided matching with indifferences
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+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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+Q5615833
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
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+A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
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+On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
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+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
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+The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
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+Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
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+On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
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+Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
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+Centralized allocation in multiple markets
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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+A dynamic school choice model
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+Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+Kidney Exchange
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+Pairwise kidney exchange
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
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+Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
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