A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts (Q766250): Difference between revisions

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-.1007/s10058-010-0105-8
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8 / rank @@
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+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2010157650
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2010157650 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S10058-010-0105-8
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S10058-010-0105-8 / rank @@
+Normal rank