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Latest revision as of 22:53, 1 July 2024

scientific article
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Constrained school choice
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    Constrained school choice (English)
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    14 September 2009
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    school choice
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    matching
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    Nash equilibrium
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    stability
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    efficiency
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    Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm
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    top trading cycles
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    Boston mechanism
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    acyclic priority structure
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