The Condorcet criterion and committee selection (Q1060661): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 17:16, 14 June 2024

scientific article
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The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
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    The Condorcet criterion and committee selection (English)
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    1985
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    Recent studies have evaluated election procedures on their propensity to select committees that meet a Condorcet criterion. The Condorcet criterion has been defined to use majority agreement from voters' preferences to compare the selected committee to all other committees. This study uses a different definition of the Condorcet criterion as defined on committees. The focus of the new definition is on candidates. That is, we consider majority agreement on each candidate in the selected committee as compared to each candidate not in the selected committee. This new definition of the Condorcet criterion allows for the existence of majority cycles on candidates within the selected committee. However, no candidate in the non-selected group is able to defeat any candidate in the selected committee by majority rule. Of particular interest is the likelihood that a committee meeting this Condorcet criterion exists. Attention is also given to the likelihood that various simple voting procedures will select a committee meeting this Condorcet criterion when one does exist.
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    committee selection
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    Condorcet criterion
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    existence of majority cycles
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    majority rule
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