Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour (Q1042332): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 05:49, 2 July 2024

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Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
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    Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour (English)
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    7 December 2009
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    manipulation
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    impartial culture
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    borda
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    anti-plurality
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    scoring rule
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    social choice
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