Implementing coordinated team play (Q1367913): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / author @@
-Jonathani Glover
@@ Property / author: Jonathani Glover / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / author @@
+Jonathani Glover
@@ Property / author: Jonathani Glover / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2249
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2022794735
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2022794735 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Exact implementation
@@ Property / cites work: Exact implementation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms
@@ Property / cites work: A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
@@ Property / cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stopping agents from ``cheating''
@@ Property / cites work: Stopping agents from ``cheating'' / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
+Normal rank