Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (Q1420524): Difference between revisions

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+Publication
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+Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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+Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
@@ Property / cites work: Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations / rank @@
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+Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
@@ Property / cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Non-cooperative matching games
@@ Property / cites work: Non-cooperative matching games / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation of college admission rules
@@ Property / cites work: Implementation of college admission rules / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
@@ Property / cites work: Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A simple selling and buying procedure
@@ Property / cites work: A simple selling and buying procedure / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A market to implement the core
@@ Property / cites work: A market to implement the core / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00047-2
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+W2025422974
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2025422974 / rank @@
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