Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule (Q1656993): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item. |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
(7 intermediate revisions by 6 users not shown) | |||
Property / author | |||
Property / author: Jia-Wen Li / rank | |||
Property / author | |||
Property / author: Róbert Ferenc Veszteg / rank | |||
Property / author | |||
Property / author: Jia-Wen Li / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / author | |||
Property / author: Róbert Ferenc Veszteg / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / describes a project that uses | |||
Property / describes a project that uses: Z-Tree / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / full work available at URL | |||
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040052 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2771826242 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes / rank | |||
Normal rank |
Latest revision as of 08:21, 16 July 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule |
scientific article |
Statements
Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule (English)
0 references
13 August 2018
0 references
Summary: We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.
0 references
institution formation
0 references
laboratory experiment
0 references
plurality voting
0 references
public-goods game
0 references
unanimity voting
0 references