The making of mathematics. Heuristic philosophy of mathematics (Q2064033): Difference between revisions

Criticizing the mainstream of philosophy of mathematics for ``not concerning itself with the making of mathematics, in particular discovery, but only with the finished matematics (\dots), this book offers an alternative approach, heuristic philosophy of mathematics, according to which the philosophy of mathematics can concern itself with the making of mathematics, in particular discovery. (\dots), the book argues that mathematics is problem solving by the analytical method and that this can account for all the main features of mathematics: mathematical method, objects, demonstrations, definitions, diagrams, notations, explanations, beauty, applicability and knowledge.'' The book is extensive and circumstantial. After introductory chapter 1 stressing the common relevance of mathematics and philosophy, and explaining the aim of the book in greater detail, there comes Part I, ``Heuristic vs. Mainstream'', presenting, in chapters 2 and 3, the rivalling philosophies of mathematics. Celluci lists ten characters of mainstream philosophy of mathematics (Section 2.3) including ``(1) The philosophy of mathematics cannot concern itself with the making of mathematics, \(n\) particular discovery, because discovery is a subjective process (\dots) (2) The philosophy of mathematics can concern itself only with (\dots) mathematics presented in finished form, because only finished mathematics is objective (\dots) (3) Since philosophy of mathematics cannot concern itself with the making of mathematics, it cannot contribute to the advancement of mathematics (\dots) (5) The method of mathematics is the axiomatic method (\dots) (8) (\dots) mathematical reasoning consists of deductive reasoning. (\dots)''. All characters are supported by citations. The rest of the chapter is devoted to arguments that, ``because of Gödel's incompleteness theorems and for several other reasons'', the characters of mainstream philosophy of mathematics are untenable and so mainstream philosophy of mathematics does not provide an adequate account of mathematics. The heuristic philosophy of mathematics (its beginnings Celluci attributes to Imre Lakatos) is characterized in another ten points (Section 3.1), contrasting with the preceding ones: ``(1) The philosophy of mathematics can concern itself with the making of mathematics, in particular discovery, because discovery is an objective process (\dots) (2) The philosophy of mathematics can concern itself also with finished mathematics (\dots) But finished mathematics is never really finished (\dots) (3) Since the philosophy of mathematics can concern itself wth the making of mathematics, it can possibly contribute to the advancement of mathematics (\dots) (5) The method of mathematics is the analytic method (\dots) (8) Since the method of mathematics is the analytic method, mathematical reasoning consists of both deductive reasoning and non-deductive reasoning.'' Then comes Part II, ``Discourse on Method'', the subject of which is ``an essential aspect of the contrast between mainstream philosophy of mathematics and heuristic philosophy of mathematics''. Thus Chapter 4, ``The question of method'', presents ``several arguments [which] have been used to deny that there is a method of discovery and even that there is a method at all (\dots), [and] finds them wanting''. Chapter 5, ``Analytic Method'', examines that method, its origin, formulation, features, fortune etc. Chapter 6, ``Analytic-Synthetic Method and Axiomatic Method'', examines some historical antecedents, starting with Aristotle, Pappus, and so on up to the formal axiomatic method of the past century. In Chapter 7, ``Rules of Discovery'', there are considered those rules and their use in founding solutions to certain historically significant mathematical problems. In Chapter 8, ``Theories'', there are described two different views of theories and it is argued that the qxiomatic view is inadequate, while the analytic view is adequate. Part III, ``The Mathematical Process'', starts with Chapter 9, ``Objects'', presenting different answers to one of the man questions of philosophy of mathematics: what is the nature of mathematical objects? There are discussed several answers, all of which are found inadequate, and there is offered an alternative one: objects are hypotheses introduced to solve mathematical problems by the analytic method. In Chapter 10, ``Demonstrations'', there comes a discussion on another main task of the heuristic philosophy of mathematics: what is the nature of mathematical demonstrations? Again, the author finds several existing answers to be inadequate and offers an alternative one: mathematical demonstration is analytical demonstration. And in Chapter 11, ``Definitions'', the author pertains to the question: what is the nature of mathematical definitions? He argues that the prevailing view is a stimulative definition but it has several shortcomings and so he presents an alternative, heuristic one. Chapter 12, ``Diagrams'', raises the question: What s the nature of mathematical diagrams? The author refutes the prevailing axiomatic answer and advances a heuristic view of mathematical diagrams. And in the final in this Part Chapter 13, ``Notations'', there is raised the question: what is the nature of mathematical notations? ``The prevailing view to to this question is the precision-conciseness view of mathematical notations. The chapter discusses this answer and finds it inadequate. Then in offers an alternative answer, the heuristic view of mathematical notations.'' Part IV, ``Functionality of Mathematics'', deals with some additional questions. In Chapter 14, ``Explanations'', the author considers the question: what is the nature of mathematical explanations? Distinguishing two kinds of them, explanations of mathematical facts and explanations of empirical facts, he argues that ``there are mathematical explanations of mathematical facts, but there are no mathematical explanations of empirical facts''. In Chapter 15, ``Beauty'', the author considers the problem of beauty in mathematics. ``Beauty is relevant not only to finished mathematics, but also, and primarily, to the making of mathematics, because it has a significant role both in finding solutions to mathematical problems and in choosing the mathematical fields and problems to pursue.'' And in Chapter 16, ``Applicability'', there s raised the question: why is mathematics applicable to the world? The author finds several existing answers inadequate and ``offers an alternative answer, but also underlines the limitations of the applicability to the world''. The final Part V, ``Conclusion'', consists of Chapter 17, ``Knowledge, Mathematics, and Naturalism'', where there is raised the question: what there is mathematics knowledge?, and of chapter 18, ``Concluding remarks'', where again mainstream philosophy of mathematics is criticized and heuristic philosophy of mathematics is praised. Each chapter is completed with ``References''; some items are repeated in different chapters, but there is no joint bibliography. And at the end of the book there are two Indexes. The book is well written, based upon sources (cited in abundance), with a clear intention to advance the case of ``heuristic'' philosophy of mathematics. It is a result of author's long studies and its parts are extensions of his previous books [Rethinking logic. Logic in relation to mathematics, evolution, and method. Dordrecht: Springer (2013; Zbl 1282.03001)] and [\textit{C. Cellucci}, Rethinking knowledge. The heuristic view. Cham: Springer (2017; Zbl 1401.03003)]. In short, the book is a valuable position which could start a debate and possible revision of modern philosophy of mathematics.