Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance (Q2370489): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 09:37, 26 June 2024

scientific article
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Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
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    Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance (English)
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    26 June 2007
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    incentive compatibility
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    budget balancing
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    interim individual rationality
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    iterative dominance
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    full surplus extraction
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    auctions with risk-averse principal
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