A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions (Q2463577): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.07.002 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.07.002 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W1991855996 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Dictatorial domains / rank
 
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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.07.002 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 19:15, 18 December 2024

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A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
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