Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems (Q2496782): Difference between revisions

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+W2120832476
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+Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
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+Q4495210
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+Q3254691
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+Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+Stable networks
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+Link formation in cooperative situations.
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+Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Strongly stable networks
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+Implementation of college admission rules
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
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+Credible coalitions and the core
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
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+Q3999327
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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