Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings (Q2640416): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item.
Set OpenAlex properties.
 
(4 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown)
Property / author
 
Property / author: Georges Bordes / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / author
 
Property / author: Georges Bordes / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01395721 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W1976220156 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 11:18, 30 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings
scientific article

    Statements