Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains (Q2819466): Difference between revisions

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-Peter Widmayer
@@ Property / author: Peter Widmayer / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / author @@
+Peter Widmayer
@@ Property / author: Peter Widmayer / rank @@
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+MaRDI publication profile
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+W2294314374
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@@ Property / arXiv ID @@
+.04277
@@ Property / arXiv ID: 1512.04277 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
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+Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
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+A Deterministic Truthful PTAS for Scheduling Related Machines
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+Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
@@ Property / cites work: Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts / rank @@
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+The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
@@ Property / cites work: The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions / rank @@
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+Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
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+Q2921720
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+Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
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+A Lower Bound of 1 + φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms
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+Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
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+Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
@@ Property / cites work: Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
@@ Property / cites work: On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions / rank @@
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+Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
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+Q2934709
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+Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
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+Optimal Auction Design
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+Algorithmic mechanism design
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+Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
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+Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
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+A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
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+Q3867502
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+Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
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+Manipulation through bribes
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation through bribes / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
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