The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions. (Q1420521): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:39, 30 July 2024

scientific article
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English
The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
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    The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions. (English)
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    2 February 2004
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    Strategy-proof
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    Mechanism design
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